

SECRET

19 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with PELOPS, 18 January 1954.

Present at ~~Mantino~~ PELOPS, PELES, and Dr. Daghlian;
[] and [] (alias), who is
"on loan" from OSI to NEA to act as Monitor.

1. PELOPS inquired whether it was possible for [] to sponsor the evacuation of 2000 bodies in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. This question had been considered in the 16 January meeting and answer was completely unchanged. That is, as the situation now stands, US evacuation facilities in that area would not be able to evacuate others than the US consulate people. Should the situation change, that in the future [] company was in a position to evacuate any number of PELOPS' bodies, this would be made known to PELOPS. PELOPS was satisfied with this answer.

2. Concerning the question of observation of the Kurd tribes, PELOPS stated that it was possible for his men to keep current on the effect of propaganda on these peoples without causing friction between the two peoples. [] feels that PELOPS does not want to create friction among those peoples who mean him and his people no harm.

3. PELOPS expressed surprise in [] interest in the Jazireh tribes and promised [] that reports on these peoples would be sent to Headquarters in the future. It should be explained that PELOPS was surprised because at some time in the past [] company advised PELOPS that it was not interested in Jazireh.

4. Money still troubles PELOPS. It is not that he feels that he will not get any or enough, but it distresses him to think that [] company might get the impression that he is in the intelligence "business"; that is, with the intention solely of selling information for what it is worth. It was made clear to him, I am sure, that our primary concern was the establishment of a sound network for the collection of intelligence and the establishment of staybehind or retardation forces and that we had no qualms concerning his sincerity.

5. It was restated that liaison between AIN and [] company left much to be desired. [] stated that he understood that this situation could and would be improved in the near future. It was mutually agreed that meetings would be held between [] and a company representative at least every ten days; that a report would be sent to Headquarters every month concerning items in which the company expresses an interest; and that a quarterly statement concerning the budget of the AIN would also be sent to Headquarters.

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6. PELOPS thanked [] for the approximately 250 fountain pens and for the training received by the six AIN bodies. He also thanked [] in advance for the training to be received by the twenty other bodies. Along this line, PELOPS requested more fountain pens and received consolation from [] promise that he would do whatever he could in this regard.

7. PELOPS stated that he has an organized force of about 160 men in Iran which can be used in the event of a crisis in that country. They are without fountain pens, however.

8. My general impression of the talks on 15, 16, and 18 Jan. 54 were this:

From PELOPS position:

PELOPS' primary aim is to secure an independent Armenian Republic. He feels that a step in this direction is the training of his personnel in the arts stated in the column on the right. He is willing to collaborate with [] for three reasons: (1) his personnel will receive this training; (2) both parties are violently anti-Communist; (3) AIN has no one else to turn to; (4) all the preceding reasons will help further his primary aim.

Satisfactory liaison does not exist between the collaborating parties ... PELOPS lays the blame for this to the other party.

PELOPS requests that requirements put on him be spelled out and that the products be received regularly.

PELOPS wants fountain pens. It should be emphasized that the various elements of the organization, which are expected to perform certain tasks must undoubtedly find themselves in very embarrassing positions without fountain pens.

From [] position:

[] primary aim is to establish a network in the AIN territory for the procurement of intelligence. A secondary interest is the organization of small cadres of AIN personnel who can execute acts of sabotage in the event of hostilities.

[] admits that in the past conditions have not been good, partially due to the ~~decrease~~ ^{decrease} of a staff member, partially because this field was not given the attention it deserves, and partially due to poor coordination in the desk in the field.

[] agrees.

[] will do what he can.

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ONE of PELOFS' men who was instructed to penetrate the Communist Party of Iran did such a fine job of penetration that he is now in prison charged with being a Communist. PELEUS was interested in knowing what opinions [] might have in this regard.

8. Perhaps I am mistaken on this point, but I do not feel that there is complete understanding in [] shop of just what the AIN capabilities are. Certainly this was true before the three conferences in which it was brought out, for example, that AIN is for all practical purposes incapable of carrying out crossborder activities in the USSR.

9. Another point is that of submitting reports by the AIN group to our liaison people in the field. Meetings with our representatives are infrequent at best, and tend to dishearten the AIN group. (This, of course, is being remedied in the near future.)

10. KUBARK is dissatisfied with the type of reports which in the past have been submitted by the AIN group. I do not feel, however, that the AIN group had a good idea of what kind of information KUBARK was interested in. I assume that the training which PELEUS has recently come by will help him considerably, but I cannot help feeling that a well-informed, bilingual KUBARK representative in the field is essential to the continued productiveness of this effort.

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V SP/NEAU V []

These annotations were requested of the case officer. They were written before he had an opportunity to read over the files

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